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Who wins the election?
Working hypothesis:
1. Each voter ranks without ties the potential candidates from
his best to his worst candidate and communicates without
cheating this ranking.
2. The election result is computed by aggregating directly these
marginal rankings into a global compromise one.
Comment
Two seminal aggregation methods, quite different in their spirit, have been proposed
in the 18th century by two French scientists:
Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, marquis de Condorcet (17 septembre 1743
– 28 mars 1794) mathe´maticien, philosophe et politologue.
Jean-Charles Chevalier de Borda (4 mai 1733 – 19 fe´vrier 1799) inge´nieur du
ge´nie maritime, mathe´maticien, physicien et politologue.
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Condorcet’s method
Principle (Condorcet 18th century)
• In 1785, Condorcet suggests to compare pairwise all the
potential candidates.
• Candidate a is preferred to candidate b if and only if the
number of voters who rank a before b is higher than the
number of voters who ranks b before a.
• A candidate, who is thus preferred to all the others, wins the
election and is called Condorcet winner.
Comment
• The Condorcet winner is always preferred by a majority of voters to all
the other candidates.
• He always defeats all the other candidates in a sequential election.
• A Condorcet winner is always unique.
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Condorcet’s Approach
Example (Evaluation and Decision Models, Bouyssou et al,
Kluwer 2000 p.14)
• Let {a, b, c , d , e, f , g , x, y} be the set of candidates in a 101 voters
election. Suppose that:
• 19 voters have preferences yabcdefgx,
• 21 voters have preferences efgxyabcd ,
• 10 voters have preferences exyabcdfg ,
• 10 voters have preferences f xyabcdeg ,
• 10 voters have preferences gxyabcdef ,and
• 31 voters have preferences yabcdxefg .
• Candidate x is here the Condorcet winner.
• However, is candidate x really better than candidate y ?
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The classical outranking approach
• In a multiple criteria decision aid context, the candidates are
the decision alternatives, the voters are the criteria and the
votes are described by a performance tableau.
• Here we say that a decision alternative x outranks a decision
alternative y if:
1. a potentially weighted majority of criteria validates the
statement that x performs at least as good as y and
2. no considerably large negative marginal performance difference
is observed in disfavour of x .
Comment
In the previous election, the statement that candidate x is preferred to
candidate y by a majority of voters, would be put to doubt by the
considerably large negative performance difference (last ranked versus
first ranked) observed in disfavour of x.
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Notations
• A = {x , y , z , ...} is a finite set of decision alternatives;
• F = {1, ..., n} is a finite and coherent family of performance
criteria;
• For each criterion i in F , the alternatives are evaluated on a
real performance scale [0; Mi ],
supporting an indifference threshold qi ,
and a preference threshold pi such that 0 6 qi < pi 6 Mi ;
• The performance of alternative x on criterion i is denoted xi ;
• Each criterion i in F carries a rational significance wi such
that 0 < wi < 1.0 and
∑
i∈F wi = 1.0.
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Performing marginally at least as good as
Each criterion i is characterising a double threshold order >i on A
in the following way:
r(x >i y) =

+1 if xi + qi > yi
−1 if xi + pi 6 yi
0 otherwise.
+1 signifies x is performing at least as good as y on criterion i ,
−1 signifies that x is not performing at least as good as y on
criterion i .
0 signifies that it is unclear whether, on criterion i , x is
performing at least as good as y .
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“At least as good as”
Majority Margins
Each criterion i contributes the significance wi of his “at least as
good as” characterisation r(>i ) to the global characterisation r(>)
in the following way:
r(x > y) =
∑
i∈F
[
wi · r(x >i y)
]
r > 0 signifies x is globally performing at least as good as y ,
r < 0 signifies that x is not globally performing at least as good as
y ,
r = 0 signifies that it is unclear whether x is globally performing at
least as good as y .
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Properties of the “at least as good as” majority margins
1. The “performing at least as good as” majority relation is
reflexive: r(x > x) = +1 for all x in A (Bouyssou 1996)
2. The “performing at least as good as” majority relation is
weakly complete: r(x > y) < 0 implies that r(y > x) ≥ 0, for
all x , y in A.
3. The asymmetric part > (“better than” part) of the relation >
corresponds to its codual (6>−1) relation.
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Marginal considerably better or worse performing situations
We redefine a single threshold order, denoted ≪i which represents
considerably less performing situations as follows:
r(x ≪i y) =

+1 if xi + vi 6 yi
−1 if xi − vi > yi
0 otherwise.
.
And a corresponding dual considerably better performing situation
≫i characterised as:
r(x ≫i y) =

+1 if xi − vi > yi
−1 if xi + vi 6 yi
0 otherwise.
. (1)
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Global considerably better or worse performing situations
A global veto, or counter-veto situation is now defines as follows:
r(x ≪ y) = >i∈F r(x ≪i y) (2)
r(x ≫ y) = >i∈F r(x ≫i y) (3)
where > represents the epistemic polarizing (Bisdorff 1997) or symmetric
maximum (Grabisch et al. 2009) operator:
r > r ′ =

max(r , r ′) if r > 0 ∧ r ′ > 0,
min(r , r ′) if r 6 0 ∧ r ′ 6 0,
0 otherwise.
(4)
Comment
!!! The > operator not being associative, we render its result unambiguous by first
gathering separately the positive terms and the negative terms and then only applying
the computation rule.
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Characterising veto and counter-veto situations
1. r(x ≪ y) = 1 iff there exists a criterion i such that
r(x ≪i y) = 1 and there does not exist otherwise any criteria
j such that r(x ≫j y) = 1.
2. Conversely, r(x ≫ y) = 1 iff there exists a criterion i such
that r(x ≫i y) = 1 and there does not exist otherwise any
criteria j such that r(x ≪j y) = 1.
3. r(x ≫ y) = 0 if either we observe no very large performance
differences or we observe at the same time, both a very large
positive and a very large negative performance difference.
Property (Self-coduality)
r(6≪)−1 is identical to r(≫).
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The polarized outranking relation %
From an epistemic point of view, we say that:
1. alternative x outranks alternative y , denoted (x % y), if
1.1 a significant majority of criteria validates a global outranking
situation between x and y , and
1.2 no serious counter-performance is observed on a discordant
criterion,
2. alternative x does not outrank alternative y , denoted (x 6% y),
if
2.1 a significant majority of criteria invalidates a global outranking
situation between x and y , and
2.2 no considerably better performing situation is observed on a
concordant criterion.
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Polarizing the global “r(%)” characteristic
The polarized bipolar-valued characteristic r(%) is defined as
follows:
r(x % y) =
[
r(x > y)>i∈F r(x ≪i y) ]
And in particular,
• r(x % y) = r(x > y) if no very large positive or negative
performance differences are observed,
• r(x % y) = 1 if r(x > y) > 0 and r(x ≫ y) = 1,
• r(x % y) = −1 if r(x > y) 6 0 and r(x ≪ y) = 1,
• r(x % y) = 0 otherwise.
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Properties of the polarized outranking relation
1. The “polarized outranking” relation is reflexive:
r(x % x) = +1 for all x in A
2. The “polarized outranking” relation is weakly complete:
r(x % y) < 0 implies that r(y % x) ≥ 0, for all x , y in A.
3. The asymmetric part  of the relation % corresponds to its
codual, i.e. the negation of its converse ( 6%−1) relation.
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Reconsidering the introductory example
Outranking without considering large performance differences:
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Reconsidering the introductory example
Polarized outranking with large performance differences:
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Concluding ...
• Outranking without taking into account large performance
differences may give doubtful results;
• Polarizing the outranking with large performance differences
makes apparent doubtful preference statements;
• Compared to the classical Electre outranking, the bipolarly
polarized outranking shows nice properties, like weak
completeness, and more important, a consistent negation of
the converse relation.
• Incomparability is modelled as indeterminate preference
statement. Its negation remains an indeterminate statement
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